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The success of a government’s COVID-19 control strategy relies on public trust and broad 
acceptance of response measures. We investigated public perceptions of the UK 
government’s COVID-19 response, focusing on the relationship between trust and 




Anonymous survey data were collected (2020-04-06 to 2020-04-22) from 9,322 respondents, 
aged 20+ using an online questionnaire.  We took a mixed methods approach to data analysis, 
combining statistical analyses, structural topic modelling (STM) and qualitative thematic 




Most respondents (95.1%) supported government enforcement of behaviour change. While 
52.1% of respondents thought the government was making good decisions, differences were 
apparent across demographic groups, for example respondents from Scotland had lower odds 
of responding positively than respondents in London. Higher educational levels saw 
decreasing odds of having a positive opinion of the government response and decreasing 
household income associated with decreasing positive opinion. Of respondents who thought 
the government was not making good decisions 60% believed the economy was being 
prioritised over people and their health. Positive views on government decision-making were 
associated with positive views on government transparency about the COVID-19 response. 
Qualitative analysis about government transparency highlighted five key themes: (1) the 
justification of opacity due to the condition of crisis, (2) generalised mistrust of politics, (3) 
concerns about the role of scientific evidence, (4) quality of government communication and 
(5) questions about political decision-making processes. 
 
Conclusion 
We recommend targeted community engagement tailored to different groups’ experiences 
and a focus on accountability and openness around how decisions are made in the response to 
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In response to the pandemic spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2) (with cases first reported in Wuhan in China’s Hubei province in December 
2019) governments across the world introduced a diverse range of control measures, varying 
in stringency and timing of implementation [1]. Interventions have included a spectrum of 
responses from the predominantly voluntary guidance (eg: Sweden) to broad-ranging and 
near complete societal lockdowns in some regions of China.  
  
The relative efficacy of different policy decisions have been, and continue to be, debated 
amongst scientists, decision-makers and the public. Previous epidemics across the world have 
shown that a key component for the success of any outbreak response measure is the extent 
of public acceptance of its legitimacy [2–4]. Trust is crucial, but it is also contextual: citizens’ 
experiences of specific interventions and their perceptions of the institutions delivering them 
are shaped by social, political and economic structures and historical trajectories [5,6]. At the 
same time, trust is not static: it can be built or lost over the course of the response. Research 
during the 2014-2016 West African Ebola outbreak for example showed how local 
responders employed varied “technologies of trust”, such as openness, accountability and 
reflexivity to respond to on the ground realities and build confidence in the measures 
implemented to contain the epidemic [7]. As risk communication and community 
engagement become increasingly recognised as central to global epidemic response 
strategies, understanding the dynamics of (mis)trust and the factors that influence the 
legitimacy of various public health measures is key for developing effective interventions [8–
10]. In the current Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, as governments have 
requested, and in some instances strictly enforced, significant behavioural change and 
sacrifices in the midst of lockdowns and economic slowdown, building trust and buy-in from 
citizens has been highlighted as a particular challenge [11].  
 
 
The UK registered its first case of COVID-19 on the 29thJanuary 2020 and in the two months 
that followed, the government implemented a number of increasingly stringent measures, 
initially delaying lockdown in favour of light-touch recommendations that the population 
should adopt social distancing and self-quarantine if experiencing symptoms. By 16th March, 
Prime Minister Boris Johnson advised against ‘non-essential travel’ and contact with others, 
whilst adults over the age of 70 and those with specific pre-existing conditions received 
recommendations to ‘shield’ for at least 12 weeks. The UK entered a nation-wide lockdown 
on 23rd March. Two days later the Coronavirus Act 2020 was passed, giving the government 
powers that prohibited gatherings and specified police powers to detain and fine people 
contravening the rules of lockdown. Our survey therefore captured the first period following 
the implementation of stringent measures (April 2020) and the ‘acute’ phase as numbers of 
infections and deaths rose steadily.  
 
Whilst the importance of trust in an effective outbreak response is widely recognised, the 
determinants of (mis)trust in epidemic response measures are less well understood. In 
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particular, qualitative research in recent epidemics has shown that we need to understand the 
dynamics of trust as they vary by socio-political context and the specific outbreak.  
 
In this paper we explore a particular aspect the dynamics of public trust in the UK 
government’s response to COVID-19, namely the relationship between respondents’ 
evaluation of the government’s pandemic response and perspectives on the transparency of 
information being made available to the public. We expand existing qualitative work in this 
field by using a mixed methods approach to data analysis, combining statistical analysis, 
structural topic modelling (STM) and qualitative thematic coding, the paper explores the how 
perceptions of UK government transparency (or lack thereof) influence broader narratives of 
trust in institutional responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.  
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Anonymous survey data from UK residents were collected online between 2020-04-06 and  
2020-04-22 using an ODK XLSForm (https://getodk.github.io/xforms-spec/) deployed on 
Enketo smart paper (https://enketo.org/) via ODK Aggregate v.2.0.3 
(https://github.com/getodk/aggregate). Form level encryption and end-to-end encryption of 
data transfer were implemented on all submissions.  
 
The survey included 49 questions which covered a broad range of topics including (1) 
Demographics, (2) Health and Health Behaviours, (3) Adherence to COVID-19 Control 
measures, (4) Information sources used to learn about COVID-19, (5) Trust in various 
information sources, government and government decision-making, (6) Rumours and 
misinformation, (7) Contact & Communication during COVID-19 and (8) Fear and Isolation. 
  
The survey was distributed using Facebook’s premium “Boost Post” feature. A “boosted” 
post functions as an advert which can be targeted at specific demographics. We boosted 
details of the survey and its URL to a target audience of 113,280 Facebook users aged 13-65+ 
years and living in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The survey was further 
distributed using a ‘daisy-chaining’ approach in which respondents were asked to share and 
encourage onward sharing of the survey’s Uniform Resource Locator (URL) among friends 
& colleagues. A number of faith institutions, schools and special interest groups were also 
contacted directly for assistance in dissemination of the URL. 
  
  
Trust and Transparency 
  
In this paper we focussed on four survey questions that, taken together, allowed us to explore 
the relationship between trust in the UK government’s COVID-19 response and perceptions 
of transparency. 
 
To gain insights into self-reported levels of trust in the UK government’s epidemic response, 
participants were asked the question “Do you think the government is making good decisions 
about how to control COVID-19?” (options “Yes” or “No”). To identify how they viewed the 
government’s prioritisation at the start of the pandemic, participants were asked “Do you 
think that the government cares more about people and their health or the economy?” 
(options “Don’t know”, “They care more about people and their health”, “They care more 
about the economy” and “About the same”). In order to explore the interplay between trust in 
the response and the role of information we asked “Do you think the government tells you the 
whole truth about coronavirus and COVID-19?” (options  “Always”, “Mostly”, 
“Sometimes”, “Almost never”, “Never” and “I don’t know”). Any participant who did not 
reply “Always” to the latter question was then invited to “Briefly describe what it is that you 
think the government is not being fully truthful about” in an open-ended text response. 
Finally, respondents were asked “Do you think that it is acceptable for governments to force 
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Ethics, Confidentiality & Participant wellbeing 
  
The study was approved by the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
observational research ethics committee (Ref: 21846). During the survey, participants were 
asked to provide (voluntarily) the first two letters of their UK postcode, thus allowing the 
study team to localise respondents to broad geographical “postcode areas”. These areas cover 
on average several hundred thousand individuals. All data were fully anonymous and the 
study team had no means by which they could identify individual respondents. All 
participants provided consent to participate in the study by ticking a box on the survey web-
form. All questions in the survey were optional (excepting age and number of people in the 
household), meaning that participants could skip questions if they chose to. 
 
  
Analysis of demographic factors 
 
We used logistic regression to test for associations between demographic factors and 
categorical outcomes on (a) participants’ opinions on the quality of government decision-
making and (b) analysis of government transparency and decision making. These analyses 
were corrected for all demographic covariates. The relationship between perceptions of 
truthfulness and the quality of government decision making by re-running model (a) with the 
additional explanatory variable coming from the question on truth. The ‘nnet’ R package was 
used to apply a multinomial log-linear model via neural networks to the detection of factors 
which were associated with opinions on government response priority. This analysis was 
corrected for all covariates. We handled missing data by performing multiple imputation by 
chained equations, completing 20 imputed datasets for all relevant fields and pooling results 
of the 20 separate analyses using Rubin’s rules. All reported percentages were calculated 




We used Structural Text Modelling (STM) [12] to identify key topics in the open-ended text 
data on what participants perceived that the government was not being fully truthful about. 
STM employs machine learning (ML) to explore open ended survey questions in a structured 
and reproducible way [13] and with a goal to identify topics and perspectives in free-text 
data. Unlike more conventional topic modelling, STM makes it possible to link topic models 
to metadata [12,13] and by doing so to identify groups of responses with similar topic 
content. This analysis was performed using the ‘stm’ package [12] for R. The text data were 
processed into a corpus and numbers, common punctuation, capitalisation and stop-words 
(such as “I”, “me”, “that's” and “because”) were removed. Only words which appeared in 20 
or more responses to the survey were retained. The number of topics was then determined by 
looking for a balance between semantic coherence (clear and understandable topics) and 
exclusivity (lack of cross-over between topics). The topic modelling was then run and the 
resulting topics were labelled manually by assessing both key words used within topics and 
representative quotes. The number of topics and the topic labels were the main subjective 
parts of the STM. Expected text proportions (ETP) were defined as the proportion of the total 
corpus which related to each topic.  
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Survey submissions with no response to the open text question (mostly from those who felt 
that the government was fully truthful, a group who were not asked to comment in open-text) 




Following the quantitative and STM analyses, we went on to conduct an in-depth qualitative 
thematic coding on subsets of the open-text responses which covered topics whose content 
allowed us to explore the qualitative dynamics of trust whilst also offering elaborations on 
the other survey questions by exploring perspectives on implementation and government 
prioritisation. In order to further tease out the relationship between trust and transparency we 
focused analysis on responses from the social groups that were found to have been 
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The 9,322 respondents over 20 years of age were predominantly female (78.5%) and aged 
between 35 and 69 years (81.6%) (Table 1). A substantial percentage of the participants (61.4 
%) had a university education. The majority of participants were members of a white ethnic 
group (95.4%) and there was under-representation of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic 
(BAME) participants (4.1%). 
   
There was almost universal agreement (96.5%, n = 8863) amongst respondents that it would 
be “acceptable for governments to force some people to change their behaviours in order to 
control COVID-19”. When asked whether they thought the government was making good 
decisions about how to control COVID-19, 52.7% (n = 4,845) answered positively. Self-
reported trust in the government’s response was not uniform across different demographic 
groups (Table 2). Compared to participants living in London, those in Scotland had a lower 
odds (OR 0.71, 95% CI 0.51 - 0.91, p = 0.001) of thinking that the government was making 
good decisions. Meanwhile, participants from the East of England, the South East and the 
West Midlands all had higher odds than Londoners of thinking that the government was 
making good decisions (Table 2). Increasing educational levels saw a decreasing odds of 
having a positive opinion of government decisions (Table 2). Similarly, decreasing household 
income correlated with decreased positivity in this respect. Males and younger adults had 
relatively lower odds of having a positive opinion of government decision making than the 
reference groups (females and age 70+, respectively).  
 
There was diversity in the opinion of different demographic groups with respect to whether 
the UK government strategy prioritised the economy, people & their health, or a balance of 
both (Figure 1). People living in Scotland (OR 2.18, 95% CI 1.94 - 2.42, p < 0.001) and 
Northern Ireland (OR 1.69, 95% CI 1.18 - 2.20, p = 0.043) had a higher odds ratio of 
believing that the economy was the priority than those in other areas. The regions which had 
higher odds than Londoners of thinking that priorities were focussed on people & their health 
included the East Midlands (OR 1.32, 95% CI 1.06 - 1.58, p = 0.046), South East (OR 1.23, 
05% CI 1.03 - 1.43, p = 0.046) and West Midlands (OR 1.28, 95% CI 1.04 - 1.52, p = 0.049). 
Groups under the age of 70 had higher odds of citing the economy as the priority 
(Supplementary Table 1). Education also played a role and compared to those whose highest 
educational achievement was O-Levels or GSCEs, the participants who had A-levels (OR 
1.53, 95% CI 1.27 - 1.79, p = 0.002) or further educational qualifications (OR 1.36, 95% CI 
1.16 - 1.56, p = 0.003) had similar tendency to believe that the focus of response was on the 
economy rather than on a balanced prioritisation. This effect was stronger still in the group 
with either a first (OR 2.1, 95% CI 1.9 - 2.3, p < 0.001) or higher degree (OR 2.22, 95% CI 
2.02 - 2.42), or indeed among the small number of participants who left school after primary 
education (Supplementary Table 1). There was a linear correlation between increasing 
household income and odds of citing the economy as the government priority (Figure 1).  
 
There was a strong relationship (Figure 2) between responses to the questions about 
government priority and quality of decision making (X-squared = 2999.4, df = 3, p-value < 
2.2e-16). Around 60% of participants who thought that the government was not making good 
decisions also thought that the economy was the priority. 4.7% of this group thought that 
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people and their health were being prioritised, while 25% thought that it was “about the 
same”.  In the group who thought more positively of government decisions, 10.17% also 
thought that the economy was the priority area. 32% thought that the focus was on people and 
their health compared to 49% who thought that the response took a balanced approach to the 
two areas.  
 
Around one third (36.5%) of respondents answered that they believed that the government 
“mostly” told the truth and compared to this group, those who answered ‘always’ to this 
question (5.8%) were more likely (OR 2.84, 95% CI 2.47 - 3.21, p < 0.001) to believe that 
the government were making good decisions about COVID-19 control. Conversely, those 
who thought that the government ‘never’ (0.5% OR 0.03, 95% CI -0.25 - 0.31, p < 0.001), 
‘almost never’ (14.4% OR 0.03, 95% CI -1.17 - 0.23, p < 0.001) or ‘sometimes’ (33.3% OR 
0.12, 95% CI 0.00 - 0.24, p < 0.001) told the truth were all less likely to think that the 
government was making the good decisions.  
 
Structural Text Modelling 
 
STM analysis of the open-text responses resulted in a corpus of 7,617 documents and 786 
terms. The model was run with 7 topics until convergence was reached. Seven topics was an 
adequate number based on review of the survey responses and the consistency within topic 
outcomes. Through analysis of example quotes (Supplementary Table 2) and keywords used, 
topics were manually labelled as (T1) Extent of Truth [ETP = 0.214], (T2) Equipment [ETP 
= 0.179], (T3) Settings [ETP = 0.181], (T4) Long-term [ETP = 0.124], (T5) Implementation 
[ETP = 0.105], (T6) Numbers [ETP = 0.095]  and (T7) Rationale/Politics [ETP = 0.100].  
 
We used the results of the STM analysis to focus our in-depth qualitative analysis on a subset 
of responses that (a) mapped to topics T1: Extent of Truth, T5: Implementation, or T7: 
Rationale/Politics and (b) came from social groups that were found to have been statistically 
most and least likely to positively evaluate the government’s decisions on COVID-19. These 
groups were (1) respondents from devolved nations, (2) respondents who were resident in 
England with lower and higher levels of education and (3) respondents resident in England 
and with incomes either under £15,000 or over £100,000. 
 
Responses were then free coded to identify sub-themes that emerged directly from the 
findings to identify particular narratives, explore qualitative differences between the groups 




Our manual qualitative coding highlighted five major sub-themes that linked together our 
three chosen topics from the STM analysis to produce a coherent qualitative narrative about 
the relationship between trust and transparency. These sub-themes were similar across 
groups, though there were differences in the way responses were articulated and in the 
prominence of particular narratives for different groups. 
  
1. Justifying a Lack of Transparency 
  
A recurrent theme across all groups included explanations of why the government could not 
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or should not divulge all information about the pandemic. There were four main types of 
justification in this sub-theme. Firstly, and most commonly, respondents argued that the 
government had to balance transparency with an avoidance of “panic”, “hysteria” or “civil 
unrest”. In these kinds of responses, participants emphasised that they did not feel that 
“untruthful” was a correct characterisation, pointing rather to a necessary withholding of 
information because “we need to keep a steady hand to come through this one [to] the other 
side”. In the University-educated group, some respondents argued that whilst they recognised 
a need for the government to control the narrative this may have also “been detrimental to 
early efforts of containment.”  
  
A second variation of the theme noted that withholding information was necessary to keep a 
very simple message and to ensure effective behaviour change in the population: 
  
“It’s not necessarily untruthfulness, I think the government needs to withhold some 
information to make rules more general. I don’t think everyone can be trusted with having 
enough common sense to curtail their activities and keep social distance for example. So, 
generalised rules and possibly over-restrictive guidelines are necessary to maintain an 
average level of obedience.” 
  
This was also expressed in a third variation, namely that government could not share all 
information because people would not be able to understand it: 
  
“I think the information they give is what they think we should know. I think they have to 
cater for the common denominator. I think they must have sensitive information which the 
masses don’t need to know”. 
  
Finally, respondents argued that the government could not tell “the whole truth” because 
they likely do not have all the information. Given that “scientifically, no one really knows 
what the ‘truth’ is yet”, it would be necessary to produce messaging that will ensure citizens 
abide by the rules: 
  
“This is a new disease, so no-one knows the ‘whole truth’ about it, including the government 
[...] They tell us what they think will lead us to follow their instructions. Truth is not arrived 
at by democratic vote.” 
 
2. Generalised Mistrust 
  
A second set of responses focused on perceptions of a lack of transparency based on overall 
negative assessments of the government and politics more generally. This was articulated for 
example through broad statements that the government was being untruthful about 
“everything” or: “I’m not sure [what they are untruthful about] but they have not been 
truthful about much in the past so it’s difficult to believe everything they say now”. For some 
respondents this reflected general perceptions that politicians are untruthful, self-interested 
and intent on prioritising economic interests. 
  
Particularly amongst low-income respondents, this was linked to assessments of the 
government’s track record, with frequent mentions of austerity and underfunding of the NHS. 
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Mistrust of government was especially common amongst residents of devolved nations, who 
expressed dissatisfaction with “Westminster” as a reason for why they felt the government 
was not telling the whole truth on COVID-19. This was particularly pronounced for Scottish 
respondents, who contrasted the response of central government with that of the devolved 
Scottish government in their assessments of transparency and competence: 
  
“Westminster are not telling the truth, they clearly do not have a clue and they all need to be 
[held responsible] when this is under control. Scottish government [is] more transparent, 
faster to react and more all round supportive.” 
  
Welsh respondents linked this more explicitly with central government’s track record in their 
region: 
  
“I don’t trust this government to fully tell the truth. In fact, given their track record over the 
last ten years, they lie, underfund vital services and appear not to care about the general 
population. They care about making money and their rich buddies”. 
  
Few respondents 87 (1.0%) were from Northern Ireland, but amongst those there was a 
disproportionate mention of “Brexit” as a factor, suggesting for example that the 
government’s focus on negotiations to leave the European Union may have distracted them 
when it came to planning a pandemic response. 
  
3. Role of Evidence 
  
Although, as noted above, some respondents accepted that existing knowledge about 
COVID-19 in the initial months of the pandemic was limited, there were significant concerns 
about what kind of evidence was being used to make decisions and how this evidence was 
conveyed. Respondents in all groups expressed concern about the balance of science against 
political or economic considerations. For example: 
  
“It is not always clear what scientific advice is being given to the government and where this 
is adjusted by political priorities, in addition the lines between scientific advice, government 
guidance, opinions of individuals and actual regulations/ legislation are very blurred and not 
well understood by a lot of the general population.” 
  
For some, this was related to concerns that the government “don’t listen to experts”, with 
University-educated respondents giving more specific comments about the kinds of expertise 
that was either not explained or followed, including: 
  
“Interpretation of the modelling. Statistics do not always tell the truth” 
  
In these discussions of evidence, questions about “herd immunity” were prominent. Although 
the government repeatedly denied that it was following a strategy that would see the virus 
spreading through the population unfettered so as to increase immunity, respondents in the 
survey who mentioned the controversy believed that this was unofficially the “overriding 
policy aim”. As one respondent put it: 
  
“I don’t believe the government is being transparent about their strategy. I believe they 
continue to follow their herd immunity strategy as they consider public loss of life 
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acceptable.” 
  
For some respondents this had been the main reason for a loss of confidence in the 




Related to the role of evidence, respondents also expressed their concern with government 
communication of key information about the pandemic, guidance and strategy. A main strand 
of discussion was around a perceived lack of coherence and clarity in messaging. This was 
especially mentioned in relation to seeming contradictions and frequent changes in policy: 
  
“…there is sometimes one piece of information one day which is contradicted the next but I 
think this is mostly scientific and medical experts who are advising the government and who 
tend to sometimes not agree with each other.” 
  
“Mixed messages” and perceptions that risk communication involved “spin” or efforts to 
“manage” or “massage” the evidence were cited as sources of confusion and mistrust. These 
narratives envisioned information being “spun” to present the government in a positive light, 
to obscure mistakes or lack of knowledge about COVID-19. These comments centred 
especially on the press briefings, which respondents felt delivered “the agreed message”. The 
sense that the pandemic response was “run on slogans” with “no detailed information” meant 
that the reasoning behind policies and policy changes were not clear. 
  
In contrast, some respondents argued that communication might be forgiven for vagueness 
and inconsistency, as long as government officials were more open and accountable, for 
instance by  
  
“Admitting their mistakes and apologising. We do not expect them to have all the answers 
and understand if errors have been made but they need to be admitted” 
  
This was seen to be essential to build confidence: “Ministers would be well advised to get 
some help from PR firms who have dealt with crises as to how to really start to build trust.” 
  
5. Decision-Making and Implementation 
  
A final group of themed responses centred on a wish for more transparency not only on key 
statistics, but also on how decisions are made. This was particularly pronounced in responses 
that argued that mistakes in implementation had been made. These mistakes were put down 
to the unclear role of evidence in defining strategies, the balance of priorities and especially 
“political decisions” and a focus on the economy.  
  
That perception that the government’s “priorities are largely involved in keeping the 
economy alive and may not involve keeping the number of deaths at a minimum” was a 
concern for many respondents. A smaller group, primarily among respondents in the high-
income bracket, this was cited as a genuine dilemma: “I think the government has a difficult 
job of balancing public health with long term fiscal security.” 
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The timing of implementation was a common concern in this sub-theme, with a particular 
focus on when the lockdown was implemented and future plans to lift restrictions. Initial 
“inaction” and delays in locking down were contrasted with the experience from other 
countries. Keeping the country open too long, some argued might have been based on 
political calculations: 
  
“[Prime Minister] Boris [Johnson] is the man who said that the real hero in Jaws was the 
guy who tried to keep the beach open. His own popularity and cabinet over-confidence has 
come at the expense of following best practice from other counties and medical experts.” 
  
Other responses around the timing and nature of implementation focused on the preparedness 
of the NHS, levels of planning at the beginning of the pandemic and the availability of testing 
and PPE.  
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Discussion 
  
Our survey results and mixed methods analysis offer some early insights into respondents’ 
perspectives of the UK government’s COVID-19 response during the first wave of the 
epidemic and response in April 2020. In summary, we found that amongst our respondents, 
there was near unanimous support for government enforcement of behaviour change. Just 
over half of our respondents thought the government was doing a good job, but this varied 
across demographic categories, with lower odds for respondents in Scotland, those who were 
younger, those with higher education and lower income levels. Respondents who did not 
believe the government was doing a good job were also more likely to believe the economy 
was prioritised over people and their wellbeing. Around 36% of respondents thought the 
government mostly told the truth. Amongst those who expressed concerns about a lack of 
transparency, we found a number of common narratives that offer insights into the 
relationship between trust and transparency, including reflections on whether a lack of 
transparency is justified in a time of crisis, deep-seated mistrust in government and concerns 
about evidence, communication and the politicisation of decision-making. 
 
Our first set of findings relate to overall levels of trust in government decision-making and 
their leadership in enforcing COVID-19 measures. Political trust, as a “basic evaluative 
orientation toward the government” [14] is widely recognised as key for the effective 
functioning of democratic institutions. This becomes ever more important in moments of 
crisis, including health emergencies, where high levels of uncertainty require confidence in 
the actors and organisations making decisions about emergency response measures. Before 
the COVID-19 pandemic, political trust was a major topic of debate amongst political 
scientists and the public alike against the backdrop of a political crisis triggered by the 2016 
referendum to leave the European Union. Analyses of the ‘Brexit crisis’ highlighted that the 
referendum reflected long-standing social divisions in the UK and low levels of trust in 
politicians and institutions [15]. This is in line with trends across Europe and the United 
States where, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, confidence in political institutions 
has steadily declined, with populist ‘anti-establishment’ parties doing increasingly well 
electorally [16]. In the UK, the 2019 Eurobarometer survey showed that 21% of respondents 
said they “tend to trust government to do the right thing”, 10 points lower than when the 
question was asked in 2001 [17]. Against this backdrop, our respondents’ evaluations of the 
UK government’s decisions over the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, whereby 
52.7% answered positively, would appear higher than expected. This may suggest that our 
respondents were more willing to back government decisions at the onset of the crisis. This 
potential “crisis effect” amongst our respondents is further supported by the fact that there 
was almost universal agreement that it would be “acceptable for governments to force some 
people to change their behaviours in order to control COVID-19”.  
  
Public acceptance of strong-handed government leadership may increase during times of 
crisis, particularly in the acute phase of an emergency. Research on counter-terrorism 
legislation after the 9-11 attacks in the U.S. has shown that ‘states of emergency’ can affect 
the perception of legitimacy of measures that curtail civil liberties in a climate of fear and 
heightened sense of risk [18]. This work has also pointed to the long-term consequences of 
these “crisis effects” for democratic values. This literature provides useful parallels for 
understanding the very high support of government enforcement of behaviour change. This 
response does not necessarily tell us about respondents’ perspectives on whether the 
government should be able to forcibly change their own individual behaviour, but rather 
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whether enforcement is justified in relation to others. Ignatieff [19] has argued (in the context 
of counter-terrorism) that majority support for restrictive measures relies on the assumption 
that these are going to be enforced against a minority who pose a threat to the community at 
large and that majoritarian acceptance of restrictions on civil liberties plays a role in the 
securitisation of minorities. In previous epidemics, divisive narratives that distinguished 
“compliant” citizens and those who were “resistant” individualised responsibility and blame, 
justifying forcible containment measures that had considerable political consequences [20]. 
Higher willingness to back the government and acceptance of a need for collective behaviour 
change are undoubtedly crucial for the outbreak response. However, our participants’ 
responses also reinforce these questions around the broader implications on political rights of 
the acceptance of strong-handed leadership during moments of crisis. 
  
This is not however the full story, as positive evaluation of the government’s COVID-19 
decisions was not the same across different groups of respondents. In particular, we found 
there to be geographical differences, with participants from some of the devolved nations 
(Scotland in particular) being less likely to evaluate government decisions positively. Income 
was positively correlated with trust (i.e. wealthier participants were more positive), and 
education inversely correlated (i,e, more educated participants were less positive) (Table 2). 
Respondents who believed that the government was prioritising the economy were more 
likely to negatively evaluate government decisions (Figure 2). This offers insights into the 
qualitative dynamics of political trust.  
  
We went on to explore the qualitative mechanisms of (mis)trust in the COVID-19 response, 
with a particular focus on the role of transparency. Whilst it is well established that trust is 
important for democracy and for crisis management in general, how trust is achieved, 
maintained or lost during an emergency is less well understood. Political scientists expect 
transparency to be an important mechanism, with citizens’ ability to access information and 
to hold governments accountable representing a core pillar of “good governance” [21]. This 
is particularly pertinent for the COVID-19 pandemic given the attention that has been given 
to the role of information and misinformation, with the World Health Organization (WHO) 
alerting to the dangers of an unfolding “infodemic” [22] and political scandals in the UK 
having influenced popular debate on the topic of good governance during lockdown.  
  
Our findings offer some initial insights on the complex role that transparency plays in 
citizens’ perspectives of the government’s response to COVID-19. Whilst 52.7% of 
respondents said the government was making the right decisions, only 42.3% thought the 
government tells the truth about COVID-19 most or all of the time. This appears 
counterintuitive if we consider common assumptions that transparency is a necessary 
condition for trustworthy governance. Our qualitative analysis of the free text answers 
suggests that this gap could be partly explained by some respondents’ justification that a lack 
of government transparency during a crisis is legitimate. These responses argued that 
governments may have to withhold information in order to prevent panic, because people 
might not fully understand or because the complexity of the full truth would make it difficult 
for everyone to comply with guidance. This further supports that there may exist a “crisis 
effect”, which conditions some of our participants’ assessments of the UK government’s 
response. This also adds to our previous question about the longer-term impact of 
emergencies on democratic values, including transparency and accountability, though we 
found that once again the picture was more complex than it might have initially seemed. Text 
mining and qualitative coding allowed us to develop a more nuanced analysis of the 
perspectives amongst our respondents, with a focus on groups who were most and least likely 
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to have a positive perception of the government’s response. Generalised mistrust in politics 
was shared across all groups as a reason for questioning the truthfulness of official 
information on COVID-19. This suggests that pre-existing institutional trust affects attitudes 
towards an emergency response, which is supported by the fact that we saw an over-
representation of survey responses that focus on low trust in central government, or on the 
government’s track record of defunding public services amongst low-income, Welsh and 
Scottish respondents. This points towards both structural and historical determinants of 
confidence in the epidemic response.  
  
Respondents highlighted a range of other factors that influenced their perceptions of the UK 
government’s response to COVID-19. Across both high-trust and low-trust groups, there 
were consistent concerns about the coherence, transparency and accountability of 
communications and decision-making, including uncertainty about the role of evidence and 
experts, as well as fears that the response was being politicised. This not only gives an insight 
into the reasons for a lack of trust in the response in low-trust groups, but also suggests that 
for high trust groups, a positive assessment of government decisions and support for 
enforcement in a time of crisis did not entirely eliminate concerns about transparency. In the 
context of debates about misinformation and the role of “fake news” circulating in 
unregulated communications platforms, our study shows that it is also important to consider 




Our sample was not population representative and respondents were predominantly white, 
female and with higher educational attainment. This means that for example, higher levels of 
trust when compared to pre-crisis levels, could reflect higher levels of structural trust in the 
sample group. In addition we expect some bias in recruitment towards demographic groups 
who use Facebook. Because of low uptake, our study was unable to elicit responses from 
Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) communities and we could  not draw any 
conclusions on the perceptions of a demographic group that has been shown to be 
disproportionately affected by the pandemic [23,24]. In addition, ethnicity matters for 
understanding structural levels of political trust, as BAME communities are more likely to 
experience discrimination and institutional racism across a spectrum of interactions with 
government [25,26]. Indeed, as the COVID-19 pandemic develops, ethnic minorities have 
been shown to be disproportionately targeted by the enforcement COVID-19 regulations, 
including higher rates of fines and arrests. In London, black people were twice as likely to be 
arrested than white people [27]. This reiterates the importance, as noted above, of exploring 




Further investigation is required to explore other factors that influence trust in the UK 
government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including the role of personal 
experiences of disease, levels of trust in the health system, economic and social impacts of 
the crisis and trust in different kinds of interventions. Comparative analysis across countries 
will also be able to highlight the relevance of different political structures, histories and 
relations for the effects of this health emergency on trust and political rights. In addition, our 
study has only looked at the acute phase of April 2020, and it will be important to continue to 
explore how perceptions of government performance change over the course of the 
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emergency and beyond. This should include efforts to understand the long-term effects of the 
COVID-19 crisis on institutional confidence. 
  
 
Maintaining trust is ever more important as the UK transitions out of the first wave of 
COVID-19 by relaxing lockdown and other restrictive measures. Our participants’ 
assessments lead us to reflect on our key finding that there are significant differences in 
levels of trust across geographical, income and educational backgrounds. Whilst structural 
determinants of (mis)trust may be hard to act upon in the short-term, it will be important to 
develop measures such as targeted community engagement that tailor messaging and public 
deliberation to the realities faced by particular social groups. In contrast to centralised and 
top-down communication, this approach can directly address the diversity of experiences and 
perspectives that exist across the country.  
 
Across all demographic groups and regardless of levels of trust, we found that study 
participants felt that a  lack of transparency was justifiable given the exigencies of crisis. For 
those respondents who were concerned about transparency, the reasons for those concerns 
were the same across all groups. Coherent communication, explanations about the sources 
and roles of different forms of evidence and priorities, a willingness to own up to mistakes 
and to explain what information cannot be shared could all be practical steps to increasing 
and maintaining trust across different groups. This would also strengthen accountability 
beyond the extraordinary times of the COVID-19 emergency.   
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Figures & Tables 
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Table 1 : Demographic characteristics of the study population 
Variable Stats / Values 
Freqs  
(% of Valid) 
Missing  
(% total) 
Are government making good 
decisions about COVID-19? 
No 4352 (47.3%) 
125 (1.34%) 
Yes 4845 (52.7%) 
What is the government’s 
response priority? 
Don't know 757 ( 8.2%) 
124 (1.33%) 
Economy 3139 (34.1%) 
People and their health 1777 (19.3%) 
About the same 3525 (38.3%) 
Extent to which government 
tells truth about COVID-19 
Never 503 ( 5.5%) 
95 (1.02%) 
Almost never 1335 (14.5%) 
Sometimes 3094 (33.5%) 
Mostly 3367 (36.5%) 
Always 535 ( 5.8%) 
I don't know 393 ( 4.3%) 
Government trust free text 
Provided text response 7617 (81.7%) 
 0 (0%) 
No text response. 1705 (18.3%) 
Acceptable to use force to 
change people's behaviours 
No 324 ( 3.5%) 
135 (1.45%) 
Yes 8863 (96.5%) 
Age 
20-34 618 ( 6.6%) 
0 (0%) 
35-54 3307 (35.5%) 
55-69 4295 (46.1%) 
70+ 1102 (11.8%) 
Education 
Completed Primary School 64 ( 0.7%) 
344 (3.69%) 
GCSE/O-levels 873 ( 9.7%) 
A level/Higher 591 ( 6.6%) 
Further education 1945 (21.7%) 
University (first) degree 2556 (28.5%) 
Post-graduate degree 2949 (32.9%) 
Gender 
Female 7244 (78.5%) 
89 (0.95%) Male 1938 (21.0%) 
All other genders 51 ( 0.5%) 
Income 
Less than £15,000 1046 (13.1%) 
1319 (14.15%) 
£15,000 - £24,999 1510 (18.9%) 
£25,000 - £39,999 1830 (22.9%) 
£40,000 - £59,999 1673 (20.9%) 
£60,000 - £99,999 1328 (16.6%) 
More than £100,000  616 ( 7.7%) 
Region 
East Midlands 638 ( 7.1%) 
401 (4.3%) 
East of England 961 (10.8%) 
North East 606 ( 6.8%) 
North West 919 (10.3%) 
Northern Ireland 87 ( 1.0%) 
London 1331 (14.9%) 
Scotland 591 ( 6.6%) 
South East 1484 (16.6%) 
South West 1052 (11.8%) 
Wales 491 ( 5.5%) 
West Midlands 761 ( 8.5%) 
Ethnicity 
Arabic 8 ( 0.1%) 
55 (0.59%) 
Asian 105 ( 1.1%) 
Black 20 ( 0.2%) 
Mixed (Other) 72 ( 0.8%) 
Mixed (White/Asian) 44 ( 0.5%) 
Mixed (White/Black) 29 ( 0.3%) 
Prefer not to say 78 ( 0.8%) 
White 8840 (95.4%) 
Another Ethnic Group 71 ( 0.8%) 
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Table 2 : Relative odds of respodents having a positive opinion of UK government decision-making 
during the COVID-19 lockdown, by demographic group 
 
Variable Group OR p 
Region 
East Midlands 1.19 (0.99 - 1.39) 0.085 
East of England 1.26 (1.09 - 1.43) 0.008 
London  Ref - 
North East 1.15 (0.95 - 1.35) 0.157 
North West 0.98 (0.80 - 1.16) 0.793 
Northern Ireland 0.85 (0.41 - 1.29) 0.488 
Scotland 0.71 (0.51 - 0.91) 0.001 
South East 1.26 (1.11 - 1.41) 0.003 
South West 1.08 (0.91 - 1.25) 0.369 
Wales 0.89 (0.68 - 1.10) 0.262 
West Midlands 1.36 (1.17 - 1.55) 0.001 
Age 
20-34 0.77 (0.56 - 0.98) 0.012 
35-54 0.65 (0.50 - 0.80) <0.001 
55-69 0.76 (0.62 - 0.90) <0.001 
70+  Ref - 
Education 
Completed Primary 
School 0.49 (-0.04 - 1.02) 0.008 
GSCE/O-Levels (ref) Ref - 
A level/Higher 0.62 (0.40 - 0.84) <0.001 
Further education 0.63 (0.45 - 0.81) <0.001 
University (first) degree 0.41 (0.24 - 0.58) <0.001 
Post-graduate degree 0.32 (0.15 - 0.49) <0.001 
Gender 
Female (ref) Ref - 
Male 0.77 (0.67 - 0.87) <0.001 
All other genders 0.73 (0.15 - 1.31) 0.284 
Income 
Less than £15,000 0.51 (0.29 - 0.73) <0.001 
£15,000 - £24,999 0.56 (0.36 - 0.76) <0.001 
£25000 - £39,999 0.60 (0.41 - 0.79) <0.001 
£40,000 - £59,999 0.72 (0.53 - 0.91) 0.001 
£60,000 - £99,999 0.85 (0.65 - 1.05) 0.097 
£100,000+ (ref) Ref - 
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1: Participant opinions on UK government prioritisation of COVID-19 response to economy or 
people and their health. The statistical model was adjusted for all covariates. Odds ratios compared to 
those who thought that the priority was a balance of both.  
Figure 2: Perspectives on government prioritisation of health and the economy, stratified by response 
to the question "Do you think the government is making good decisions about how to control COVID-
19?" (Yes/No). Missing answers were excluded (125 for ‘right decision’ question, 124 for ‘priority’ 
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Supplementary Table 1 : Participant opinions on UK government prioritisation of COVID-19 response to 
economy or people & their health. Odds ratios compared to those who thought that the priority was a balance 
of both. 
 
 Perceived Government Priority 
 The Economy People & Their Health Don't know 
Variable Group OR p OR p OR p 
Region East Midlands 1.01 (0.77 - 1.25) 0.928 1.32 (1.06 - 1.58) 0.036 1.14 (0.78 - 1.50) 0.460 
East of England 0.95 (0.75 - 1.15) 0.654 1.15 (0.92 - 1.38) 0.223 1.08 (0.77 - 1.39) 0.634 
London (ref) - - - - - - 
North East 1.2 (0.97 - 1.43) 0.110 1.01 (0.73 - 1.29) 0.939 0.88 (0.49 - 1.27) 0.529 
North West 1.22 (1.02 - 1.42) 0.051 0.96 (0.71 - 1.21) 0.755 0.92 (0.59 - 1.25) 0.622 
Northern Ireland 1.69 (1.18 - 2.20) 0.043 0.77 (0.03 - 1.51) 0.496 1.26 (0.44 - 2.08) 0.578 
Scotland 2.18 (1.94 - 2.42) <0.001 1.08 (0.76 - 1.40) 0.647 1.54 (1.16 - 1.92) 0.025 
South East 0.97 (0.79 - 1.15) 0.709 1.23 (1.03 - 1.43) 0.046 0.83 (0.54 - 1.12) 0.215 
South West 1.11 (0.91 - 1.31) 0.313 1.06 (0.83 - 1.29) 0.601 0.98 (0.66 - 1.30) 0.917 
Wales 1.2 (0.96 - 1.44) 0.142 0.77 (0.45 - 1.09) 0.117 0.81 (0.39 - 1.23) 0.339 
West Midlands 0.88 (0.66 - 1.10) 0.262 1.28 (1.04 - 1.52) 0.049 0.85 (0.50 - 1.20) 0.369 
Age 20-34 1.65 (1.40 - 1.90) <0.001 0.66 (0.36 - 0.96) 0.005 1.02 (0.63 - 1.41) 0.916 
35-54 1.84 (1.66 - 2.02) <0.001 0.79 (0.60 - 0.98) 0.017 1.05 (0.77 - 1.33) 0.703 
55-69 1.52 (1.35 - 1.69) <0.001 0.94 (0.76 - 1.12) 0.502 1 (0.74 - 1.26) 0.998 
70+ (ref) - - - - - - 
Education Completed Primary School 2.01 (1.40 - 2.62) 0.026 1.11 (0.41 - 1.81) 0.778 1.12 (0.02 - 2.22) 0.84 
GCSE/O-levels (ref) - - - - - - 
A level/Higher 1.53 (1.27 - 1.79) 0.002 1.15 (0.88 - 1.42) 0.327 1.19 (0.77 - 1.61) 0.429 
Further education 1.36 (1.16 - 1.56) 0.003 0.9 (0.69 - 1.11) 0.335 1.09 (0.77 - 1.41) 0.584 
University (first) degree 2.1 (1.90 - 2.30) <0.001 0.87 (0.66 - 1.08) 0.178 1.48 (1.17 - 1.79) 0.014 
Post-graduate degree 2.22 (2.02 - 2.42) <0.001 0.76 (0.55 - 0.97) 0.012 1.34 (1.02 - 1.66) 0.073 
Gender Female (ref) - - - - - - 
Male 1.16 (1.04 - 1.28) 0.019 1.05 (0.91 - 1.19) 0.492 1.05 (0.85 - 1.25) 0.655 
All other genders 2.15 (1.48 - 2.82) 0.026 0.88 (-0.16 - 1.92) 0.813 1.88 (0.84 - 2.92) 0.233 
Income Less than £15,000 2.55 (2.30 - 2.80) <0.001 0.72 (0.43 - 1.01) 0.026 1.64 (1.20 - 2.08) 0.026 
£15,000 - £24,999 2.05 (1.81 - 2.29) <0.001 0.84 (0.58 - 1.10) 0.185 1.72 (1.30 - 2.14) 0.011 
£25000 - £39,999 1.82 (1.59 - 2.05) <0.001 0.76 (0.51 - 1.01) 0.035 1.66 (1.27 - 2.05) 0.011 
£40,000 - £59,999 1.52 (1.29 - 1.75) <0.001 0.85 (0.60 - 1.10) 0.197 1.47 (1.08 - 1.86) 0.053 
£60,000 - £99,999 1.35 (1.11 - 1.59) 0.012 0.83 (0.58 - 1.08) 0.161 1.26 (0.86 - 1.66) 0.267 
> £100,000 (ref) - - - - - - 
Model corrected for all covariates 
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 Topic Topic Summaries ETP 
T1 Equipment 
 
• Availability of PPE for NHS staff 
• Testing capacity 
• Health System preparedness 
 
0.179 
T2 Extent of Truth 
 
• The public don’t need to know the whole truth 
• Government withholds information to avoid panic/ in the public interest 
• Reasons for lack of transparency 
 
0.214 
T3 Rationale/ Politics 
 
• Reasons for policy and changes 





• Numbers of deaths/ people infected with COVID-19 
 
0.095 
T5 Long term 
 





• COVID-19 in care homes 
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